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AND BRUCE R. BRAUN**
Both in life and death, John Wayne Gacy left a profound mark on the
fabric of American life and the American legal system. The startling
news of the former clown's thirty-four murders and their grisly and hor-
rific details-previously unimaginable to a public yet to be exposed to
the macabre deeds of Ted Bundy and Jeffrey Dahmer-forced society to
confront the deepest depths of the human spirit and the moral soundness
of a civilization in which the unthinkable becomes reality.
Gacy left an equally penetrating and perhaps longer-lasting mark on
the legal system. His federal habeas corpus petition, which marked his
last attempt to stave off the executioner's sword, forced the federal judi-
ciary to confront the realities and inherent weaknesses of a judicial sys-
tem in which a jury, tethered to the rule of law only by the judge's
instructions on the law, determines who will live and who will die. When
Gacy presented the federal courts with compelling empirical data ad-
dressing the fundamental issue of whether capital sentencing juries com-
prehend the complex and arcane pattern death penalty instructions
given them by state trial courts, the federal courts refused to declare the
obvious: that juries do not (indeed cannot) comprehend the pattern in-
structions. Although it characterized the instructions as "polysyllabic
mystification," the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Cir-
cuit, through Judge Frank Easterbrook, cast a blind judicial eye towards
empirical evidence of the incomprehensibility of the instructions and
created and adopted an irrebuttable presumption that jurors compre-
hend jury instructions.
This article addresses and analyzes this absolute and irrebuttable pre-
sumption that jurors follow their instructions. Specifically, it discusses
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** B.A., Haverford College, 1985; J.D., University of Virginia School of Law, 1989. Mr.
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the presumption's application in civil and noncapital criminal cases and
demonstrates that, throughout our jurisprudence, the presumption has
not been inviolate but instead has given way whenever the defendant's
interests outweigh those of the State. The article then argues accord-
ingly that the presumption should be rebuttable in capital cases, particu-
larly in the face of valid and reliable empirical evidence to the contrary.
I. INTRODUCTION
The story of John Wayne Gacy's impact on the law begins with the
unlikeliest of pairs: the ironically named James P. Free, Jr., a fellow Illi-
nois death row inmate, and Professor Hans Zeisel, the dean of jury and
juror research and co-author of the seminal work, The American Jury.
In 1990, during the twilight of a career that took him to the pinnacle of
his profession as a social scientist, Zeisel turned his talents and attention
to studying whether Illinois' pattern jury instructions for capital cases
(the "Capital IPr') and the Illinois Death Penalty Act (the "Act") pro-
vide Illinois capital jurors with constitutionally adequate guidance in de-
termining whether to sentence a capital defendant to life imprisonment
or death by lethal injection.
Since its landmark 1973 decision in Furman v. Georgia' striking down
state capital sentencing regimes nationwide as arbitrary and capricious,
the Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence increasingly has
required that states channel and guide the sentencing discretion of capi-
tal juries to determine who will live and who will die. The primary
means of channeling juror discretion is jury instructions on the law.
Such instructions provide the jury with standards and boundaries, which
limit a jury's discretion and thus protect against the arbitrary and capri-
cious imposition of the death sentence.
Prior to Zeisel's Study, in a pair of decisions the Seventh Circuit had
found that the Capital IPI were comprehensible, and thus provided con-
stitutionally adequate guidance on all issues the United States Supreme
Court has deemed constitutionally relevant to the imposition of the ulti-
mate sanction.2 In those cases, however, the defendants offered no em-
pirical or other evidence on the Act's actual operation or on the
comprehensibility of the Capital IPI, but instead simply asked the court
to find, based on its own interpretation, that the instructions were consti-
tutionally inadequate. The court, its decision based not on substantive
1. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
2. See Silagy v. Peters, 905 F.2d 986 (7th Cir. 1990), cert denied, 498 U.S. 1110 (1991);
Williams v. Chrans, 945 F.2d 926 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3002 (1992).
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evidence but only on its own surmise that jurors understood the Capital
IPI, rejected the defendants' bald contentions and upheld the constitu-
tionality of the Capital IPI and the Act.
Zeisel thus set out to test the judicial conclusions regarding the ade-
quacy of the instructions. The traditional method of testing the compre-
hensibility of jury instructions is to use "mock jurors," often college
students, who are paid for their service. Due primarily to a strain on
judicial resources and partly on a natural hostility towards social science,
courts generally have been unwilling to allow social scientists such as
Zeisel to conduct their studies with actual jurors. Thus, existing studies
on juror comprehension, despite showing high levels of miscomprehen-
sion, have been subject to the criticism that they do not accurately mea-
sure the comprehension levels of actual jurors.3
Zeisel, however, had persuaded the Chief Judge of the Circuit Court
of Cook County to permit him unprecedented access to the jury venire
at the Cook County Courthouse. On two separate days Zeisel presented
a randomly selected pool of actual Illinois jurors with a study designed to
test their comprehension of the Capital IPI. The study tested the in-
structions in the context of the facts of the death penalty case of James
Free. Zeisel believed that Free's case provided an ideal basis for the
study because, although Free had been convicted of murdering one wo-
man and wounding another during a botched attempt to rape them, Free
presented substantial evidence in mitigation, including the lack of a
criminal record, an exemplary military career, and that he was under the
influence of PCP on the night of his crimes. Zeisel believed that such a
"close" case on the issue of life or death was best for testing the compre-
hensibility of the Capital IPI.
Zeisel then presented the jurors with sixteen questions designed prin-
cipally to test juror understanding of the Capital IPI on five important
and interrelated issues that the Supreme Court has deemed constitution-
ally significant. The study asked whether jurors understood that: (1)
they need not unanimously agree on the existence of a mitigating factor
before a juror can consider that factor; (2) they may consider mitigating
factors not mentioned by the court as reasons not to impose death; (3)
the state bears the burden of persuasion; (4) the juror must weigh miti-
gating factors against the aggravating factors; and (5) the jury must
unanimously agree on the ultimate verdict of death. The results of the
Zeisel Study were startling. The jurors demonstrated high levels of mis-
comprehension on each of these five issues. For instance, although the
3. See VAL-iE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMER, JUDGING THE JURY 120-27 (1986).
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United States Supreme Court has made it clear that it is unconstitutional
to require juror unanimity regarding the existence of a mitigating factor
before any one juror can give weight to that factor,4 almost one-third of
the jurors interpreted the instructions as prohibiting the consideration of
a mitigating factor unless the jury unanimously agreed that the evidence
constituted a mitigating factor. Similarly, although it is well established
that the jury must be permitted to consider, as a mitigating factor, any
aspect of the capital defendant's character, crime, or record as a basis for
a sentence of less than death,' more than one-half of the jurors misun-
derstood their ability to consider mitigating circumstances. Moreover,
although it was not mentioned in examples by the trial court in Illinois
that the state bears the ultimate burden of persuasion, a majority of the
jurors misunderstood who had the burden of persuasion as to the ulti-
mate issue of life or death.
The source of the misunderstanding revealed by the Zeisel Study un-
doubtedly was the Capital IPI, which are remarkably opaque and incom-
prehensible. For instance, Illinois law requires that a capital sentencing
jury "weigh" the aggravating and mitigating factors to determine
whether to sentence the defendant to life or death.' However, rather
than simply direct the jury to engage in a weighing process, the instruc-
tions inexplicably tell the jury mitigating evidence was not "sufficient too
preclude" the imposition of a sentence of death. The Zeisel Study
demonstrated beyond any reasonable doubt that this "sufficient to pre-
clude" language did not convey to jurors the understanding that it was
their duty to weigh the evidence. Instead, the Study showed that jurors
believed that it created a presumption of death that required them to
find the existence of mitigating factor of sufficient magnitude to warrant
a life sentence.
Free presented the results of the Zeisel Study in support of his pend-
ing federal habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois, offering the Study as empirical evidence
in support of his contentions that the Act and the Capital IPI: (1) uncon-
stitutionally impose a presumption in favor of death and shift the burden
to the defendant to overcome that presumption; (2) fail to assign a spe-
cific standard of proof as to the ultimate issue; and (3) are unconstitu-
tionally vague and fail to channel narrowly the sentencing authority's
decision.
4. See Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 373-75 (1988).
5. See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 578, 604-05 (1978).
6. See People v. Bean, 560 N.E. 2d 258 (Ill. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1338 (1991).
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Federal district court Judge Marvin Aspen ordered a magistrate
judge to conduct an evidentiary hearing into the validity and impact of
the Zeisel Study on three grounds raised in Free's habeas petition.7 In
that decision, Judge Aspen noted that if valid, the Zeisel Study calls into
question the assumptions underlying the Seventh Circuit's earlier hold-
ings regarding the constitutional sufficiency of the instructions. Judge
Aspen concluded that because the validity of a conviction under the Act
depends on whether the jury understands the law it is applying, a deter-
mination of validity should be based if possible on substantial evidence
rather than judicial assumptions."
The magistrate judge conducted a lengthy evidentiary hearing at
which the nation's leading experts in juror comprehension, statistics, and
linguistics testified that the Zeisel Study results were valid and reliable.
At the conclusion of two weeks of evidence, the magistrate judge found
that this "compelling" empirical evidence, not available when the Sev-
enth Circuit previously determined the adequacy of the instructions, re-
futed the judicial assumptions in those cases that the Capital IPI and the
Act provide constitutionally adequate guidance to capital sentencing ju-
rors. The magistrate judge concluded that because "[t]he Zeisel studies
establish that neither [the Free instructions or Capital IPI] is intelligible
and definite enough to provide even a majority of jurors hearing them
with a clear understanding of how they are to go about deciding whether
a defendant lives or dies," the Act and the Capital IPI "[permit] the
arbitrary and unguided imposition of the death sentence and that Free's
sentence was imposed in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments."9
In an exceptional decision, Judge Aspen adopted the magistrate
judge's decision in its entirety. He held that "[a]fter an exhaustive six-
day hearing, post-trial briefing before Magistrate Judge Weisberg and
the objection process before this court, we are convinced that the Zeisel
surveys are in fact statistically reliable and valid, that is it fairly represent
the levels of comprehension of the survey respondents regarding the
capital sentencing instructions used in those surveys." 10 Based on this
holding, Judge Aspen concluded:
7. United States ex rel. Free v. Peters, 778 F. Supp. 431 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
8. I& at 434-35. Free also presented the Diamond-Casper study, a contemporaneous and
similar study which tested jury comprehension of judicial instructions, including the Capital
IPI.
9. United States ex reL Free v. McGinnis, 818 F.Supp. 1098, 1129-30 (N.D. Ill. 1992).
10. United States ex reL Free v. Peters, 806 F.Supp. 705 (N.D. Il1. 1992).
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The conclusion to be drawn from the Zeisel survey data is appar-
ent: The Illinois statute, as implemented through the IPI and Free
jury instructions, permits the arbitrary and unguided imposition
of the death sentence. As such, Free's sentence was imposed in
violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the
United States Constitution."
Accordingly, Judge Aspen granted Free's habeas corpus petition.
At the time of Judge Aspen's ruling in Free, another district court in
Illinois had just denied Gacy's own federal habeas corpus petition. At
Gacy's trial, the trial court had instructed his jury in accordance with the
Capital IPI tested by Zeisel. Accordingly, following Judge Aspen's rul-
ing in Free, Gacy filed a motion to reconsider the claims raised in his
habeas petition, contending that the district court should consider the
facial unconstitutionality of the Illinois death penalty in light of the Free
decision. After the district court refused to entertain the Rule 60(b) pe-
tition as untimely and procedurally infirm, Gacy appealed to the Seventh
Circuit.
Although the State of Illinois had already appealed the district
court's ruling in Free by the time Gacy filed his appeal, Gacy leaped
ahead of the Free case on the Seventh Circuit's docket when, at the
State's request, that court remanded the Free case to the district court
for it to conduct collateral proceedings relating to newly raised discovery
issues.
In his appeal before the Seventh Circuit, Gacy contended that the
district court erred in refusing to entertain his Rule 60(b) motion. He
requested that the Seventh Circuit reverse the district court's decision
and remand to the district court for consideration of his motion. The
State contended that Gacy had waived his right to rely on the Zeisel
Study and the Free district court decision by failing to raise it in the
lower court. Neither Gacy nor the State asked the Seventh Circuit to
review the Zeisel Study or the district court's decision in Free or the jury
instructions.
Nonetheless, during oral argument, the panel, led by Judge Frank
Easterbrook, demanded that the parties submit additional briefing on
the issue of whether that panel of judges should address on the merits
(and likely overrule) the Free district court decision. When Gacy's coun-
sel suggested that the court should permit Gacy to present the issue in a
subsequent habeas petition, Judge Easterbrook boldly stated from the
11. Id. at 731-32 (footnote omitted).
[Vol. 78:791
LEGAL LEGACY OF JOHN WAYNE GACY
bench that there would be no further habeas proceedings for the
defendant.
The parties filed additional briefing on the issue. Free, whose case
was mired in the district court due to the illness of the magistrate judge
assigned to the collateral discovery issue, filed an amicus brief urging the
Seventh Circuit to refrain from addressing the merits of the Zeisel Study
issues raised in Judge Aspen's decision.
II. THE SEVENTH CIRcurr's DECISION IN GA CY
Even though the Zeisel Study was not in the record before it, com-
prised no part of the lower court's decision, and neither party had asked
for a substantive resolution of the matter before the court, the Gacy
court neither remanded the case nor treated the issue as waived; instead
it addressed the Zeisel Study and the Free district court decision on the
merits.
After noting what it believed to be flaws in Professor Zeisel's meth-
odology, Judge Easterbrook, writing on behalf of the Gacy court, held
that the entire Zeisel Study, along with the other empirical evidence ad-
duced by Free below, was a useless exercise because courts invoke an
irrebuttable "presumption" that juries understand and follow the in-
structions given. Actual comprehension was irrelevant, according to the
Gacy court, because the law presumes that jurors understand the trial
court's instructions. The Gacy court wrote:
One enduring element of the jury system, no less vital today than
two centuries ago, is insulation from questions about how juries
actually decide .... Instead of inquiring what juries actually un-
derstood, and how they really reasoned, courts invoke a "pre-
sumption" that jurors understand and follow their instructions.
As Rule 606(b) shows, this is not a bursting bubble, applicable
only in the absence of better evidence. It is a rule of law-a de-
scription of the premises underlying the jury system, rather than a
proposition about jurors' abilities and states of mind.12
Judge Easterbrook and the rest of the Gacy panel did not find that the
instructions were either clear or comprehensible. Indeed, it character-
ized the instructions as "polysyllabic mystification," and noted that such
infirmities "diminish the quality of justice."' 3 Nonetheless, the Gacy
court was untroubled by the arcane and incomprehensible language of
12. Gacy v. Welborn, 944 F.2d 305, 313 (7th Cir. 1993).
13. Id. at 314.
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